

INSIDER JOB - THE CULPRIT TO CARGO CRIME IN MALAYSIA

Ching Eng Leong

PhD Candidate in Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University Sains Malaysia

elching.engleong@honeywell.com

Abstract

Insider threats exist within many organizations where employees (insiders) collude with criminal outside the organization to commit crime. The threat are caused by perceived as injustices, retaliation, sense of entitlement, underwriting needs for attention, employees are taking action as part of the contrived solution that results in negative consequences for their organization. The objective of this research is to look into cases of cargo crime related to insider job in Malaysia. Research has been carried out through structured interviews with security managers, transport manager, logistics manager in Malaysia and literature review. Only security managers and logistics personnel who have conducted internal investigation related to cargo crime have been interviewed. Their information sharing is very valuable in this research as researcher is able to get first hand information related to insider job during their internal investigation. Reports from local newspaper on cargo crime related to insider job are included in this research. Findings from this research indicated that most of all cargo thefts in Malaysia are related to 'insider jobs' and the 'insider' either act alone or in group to collaborate with cargo thieves. It is a major threat that remains unseen and undetected disposing valuable information on company's cargo security procedures. The insiders can significantly drain their employer's resources, assets and profits. Insiders pose a serious risk to cargo security that is often overlooked when decisions are made to implement security procedures and controls. Since insider job can cost any company a lot of money, the best method is to avoid employees to become insider threat to prevent it from ever happening.

Keywords: Insider threat; proprietary data; hijacking; cargo theft; security risk

INTRODUCTION

Cargo thieves have learned to become sophisticated more tactical about striking a crime. A lucrative black market keeps cargo thieves going and impacting the global economy. Cargo theft has been around for centuries, from robbers attacking merchants on trading roads to pirates seizing ships at sea to bandits on horseback robbing stage coaches. Unfortunately, cargo crime has been evolving along with cargo transportation modes. Trucks have replaced horse-drawn carriages, and today's criminals are organized into international crime syndicates. Cargo theft is an international problem affecting consumers and manufacturers alike. In today's global economy, raw materials manufacturing and sourcing often occurs in one part of the world, while the finished product is produced and stored or consumed in another part of the globe. Cargo can be easily stolen or hijacked at any point in between. Cargo thieves are becoming very productive and work in highly organized groups, targeting specific cargoes and employ people with the skill set they requires. Some are specialist who can bring a different set of criminal skills to the group. Take for example professional cargo thieves, who will setup their operations base at truck yards, hubs for commercial freight cargoes, airports and sea ports. While criminals who are targeting cash and valuable items will setup their operation in different locations. Cargo thieves used sophisticated systems and equipments with well organized hierarchies of leadership. They are willing to employ specialists who can carry out different tasks and responsibilities including thieves, brokers, warehouse operatives or fences that help upload the stolen goods. The fences also work with drivers in transferring the stolen goods and deliver to the black market. Recently in Malaysia, many foreign laborers were used to move the goods and work with drivers in transporting the stolen merchandize from the premises in order to avoid exposure identity of the syndicate. In fencing, goods are brought from another party who is in illegal possession of those goods.

Background Studies

The cargoes stolen in Malaysia usually disposed through fences for local market and most of the time high value and high technology cargoes are taken out of the country in a very short time to avoid being detected by the Police. Cargo thieves heist whole truck load of merchandize can be valued at up to few million dollars depending on the type of cargoes they are carrying. There are many cases especially cargo of electronics and high technology products were hijacked in Malaysia and found in the black market overseas the next day. This is how efficient and sophisticated network the professional cargo thieves are having. There is no such specific research on insider job related to cargo crime in Malaysia. This research is being taken to look into cases of cargo crime related to insider job. Research has been carried out through

structured interviews with security managers, transport manager, logistics manager in Malaysia and literature review. Cargo crime statistics is being retrieved from reliable sources since Malaysia Police is unable to provide cargo crime statistics due to the confidentiality of the information. The volume and trend of cargo movement in Malaysia is being scrutinized and statistics are retrieved from Malaysia statistics department. Reports from local newspaper on cargo crime are included in this research. Police investigation reports on insider job related to cargo crime are not available as such report is confidential. Only security managers and logistics personnel who have conducted internal investigation related to cargo crime have been interviewed. Their information sharing is very valuable in this research as researcher is able to get first hand information related to insider job during the internal investigation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Cargo Theft

Cargo theft is the criminal act of taking of any cargo including, but not limited to goods, chattels, money, baggage that constitutes, in whole or part, a commercial shipment of freight moving in commerce from any pipeline system, railroad car, motor truck, or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage facility, stolen house, platform, or depot, or from any vessel or wharf, or from any aircraft, air terminal, airport, aircraft terminal or air navigation facility, or from any intermodal container, intermodal chassis, trailer, container freight station, warehouse, freight distribution facility, or freight consolidation facility (FBI, 2013). For the purposes of this definition, cargo shall be deemed as moving commerce at all points between points of origin and the final destination, regardless of any temporary stop while awaiting transshipment or otherwise. As early as 1996, (prior to Internet crime), a survey of 400 firms conducted by the U.S. Small Business Administration found nearly 13% of surveyed businesses became crime victims. Further, less than half employed (48%) employed any security measures and many incidents, especially employee thefts, went unreported (Small Business Research Summary, 1997).

Research conducted by Andy Wilson (2004) shows that 68% of respondent organizations have a policy addressing corporate fraud. The project also identified 59% of respondent organizations have an anonymous reporting mechanism in place. Many cite the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA as the driving catalyst for these prevention and detection techniques. Over 50% of the respondent organizations claim management is responsible for the prevention of employee crime, yet it is reported that management only detects crime 20% of the time. 40% of the time, discovery was merely by accident. 52% of the respondents report that company controls are the most effective factor in preventing/ identifying employee dishonesty, yet the same respondents' reports that controls detect crime is less than 10% of the time.

In William, Katz, Lang and Summers (1989) research conducted related to employee pilferage especially conspicuous in some industries. It is believed that 80% of shipping losses in the freight shipping and airport cargo handling industries arise from employee theft (Willis, 1986). 42% of all retail shrinkage, which averages 1.8% of sales, is due to employee theft according to 1986-87 survey of 113 retailers (Arthur Young and company, 1987). Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that about 30% of retail employees misuse discount privileges or directly steal merchandise from their employers. 27% of hospital employees take hospital supplies at least once a year and about 9% of manufacturing workers falsify their time cards.

Increase cargo volume, increases the risk


Transportation is one of the activities within the supply chain and it refers to the movement of cargo or goods from one location to another as it makes its way from the beginning of a supply chain to the end users. Transportation mode is a very important driver within the supply chain because products are rarely produced and consumed in the same location. Industries or manufacturers are very dependent on the transportation to transfer their products from one location to another. The role of transportation is even more significant in global supply chains. Transportation allows products or cargoes to move across globally. Similarly, global transportation allows retailers to sell products manufactured all over the world to be sold in different countries. Transnational trade is becoming a bigger part of today's world economic activities. Malaysian logistics industry targeted to grow 10.3 per cent to RM129.93 billion in 2012, an increase from an estimated RM117.8 billion a year ago. External trade for Malaysia was expected to increase 5.9 per cent to RM1.42 trillion in 2012, compared with RM1.24 trillion in 2011 (Kamarul, 2012). Kamarul (2012) commented that the growth of Malaysia external trade signifies the growth of the transportation needs to support the growth. Whereas Gopal (2012) Frost & Sullivan Vice President for transportation and logistics practice Asia Pacific said Malaysia's strategic advantage is due to its geographical location. The focus on improving supply chain efficiency will also drive growth in the local logistics industry as reported in Malaysia Logistics Directory 2012/2013 (Chang, 2012). The Malaysian logistics industry is forecasted to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 11.6 per cent to reach RM203.71 billion in 2016 (Chang, 2012).

Cargo Growth in Malaysia

Figure 1 and 3 shows the growth of export in Malaysia and it continues to grow from year to year except in 2009 where worldwide economy downturn affected the growth in airports sector. Handling of containers at seaport is very consistent (Figure 2). As for cargoes handled in the


airport sector, international cargo continues to grow from 2001 until 2006 at peak of 861,709 metric tons and declined for 3 years after that due to economic downturn. The volume of the airport sector increases again after 2009. Figure 4 shows the comparison of different sectors and transportation using air mode is significant than the other sectors. The road sector is not reported here as eventually all the incoming or outgoing cargoes will have to use road transportation to the seaport, airport and also railway. In Malaysia the road transportation handled more than 1,400,000 tonne metric a year if we take the combination of all the sectors volumes using road transportation before arriving at the ports as shown in Figure 5. It is therefore can be concluded that the risk of cargo movements on the road is high and organization should be taking security control measures to ensure their cargo is safe while on the road en-route to their destination.

Figure 1: Mail movements at all Malaysian airports




Source: Statistics from Malaysia Ministry of Transportation

Figure 2: Cargo movement at all Malaysians seaports




Source: Statistics from Malaysia Ministry of Transportation

Figure 3: Cargo movement at all Malaysians airports




Source: Statistics from Malaysia Ministry of Transportation

Figure 4: Cargo movement at all Malaysians airports



Source: Statistics from Malaysia Ministry of Transportation

Figure 5: Total Cargo Movement in Malaysia



Source: Statistics from Malaysia Ministry of Transportation

Cargo crime statistics in Malaysia

Table 1 shows the statistic of cargo crime in Malaysia and this data is retrieved from reliable source as the Police department was not able to share the statistics due to the confidentiality of the information. Although the trend of cargo crime is on the decline in recent years, the economic impact is still massive and the cost of cargo thefts runs into the millions if not billions dollars. Generally the trend of cargo crime has been decreasing from year to year and at the moment, it is not certain why these cases have been decreasing.

Table 1. Malaysia Cargo Crime Statistics by Type

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Hijack	64	95	162	223	164	93	36	42	12
Warehouse Robbery	96	58	50	69	59	65	19	10	6
Warehouse Break-in	200	12	4	32	2	5	1	1	0
Theft of Laden Truck	30	17	11	33	20	19	9	7	3
Total cases	390	182	227	357	245	182	65	60	21

Research on Cargo Crime in Malaysia related to 'Insiders Job'

Cargo crimes have been reported quite frequently in Malaysia for many years. After investigation, most of the cases will revealed that the crimes are committed with the assistance of inside person. An insider's job is very important for criminal to commit the crime. A snapshot view of some of the reported cargo crime cases related to insider job in Malaysia as below:

- i. April 24th 2014 – Police believe the pirates who attacked the Singapore owned oil tanker Naninwa Maru No. 1 in the Straits of Malacca near Pulau Ketam on Tuesday April 22nd 2014 may have had “inside help”. This is based on several events when pirates boarded the oil tanker carrying five million liters of diesel, siphoning off part of the cargo and kidnapping three Indonesia crew members. “We believe the heist was pulled off possibly with ‘inside help’ from certain crew members,” said federal marine police deputy commandant (operations and intelligence) ACP Abdul Rahim Abdullah. Senior crew members of the ship did not raise the alarm or send out a distress signal when the incident occurred at 1am, or when the captain, first officer and chief engineer were taken away, reported in The Sun.
- ii. December 22nd, 2013 - Another case of “hijack on the road” happened saw thieves escaping with RM800,000 worth of microchips after driving off with a lorry in the Free Industrial Zone in Bayan Lepas Penang, Malaysia. The lorry was later recovered 1.5km away with 12 out of 22 boxes reportedly missing. Police detained the driver and were trying to find out if it could have been an insider job said Deputy OCPD Balik Pulau Deputy

Supt Lai Fah Hin (The Star, Dec, 2013). Two days later, Police arrested two men believed to be involved.

- iii. October 9th, 2013 - Five men were charged at the Sessions Court in Shah Alam for hijacking a trailer loaded with shampoo worth RM49,000 armed with machetes during the hijack. Unemployed Hanafiah Musukutty; lorry drivers Nandakumar and Murugan; security guard Sukumaran and lorry attendant Nala pleaded not guilty to the armed gang robbery of the trailer belonging to SKA Transport Sdn Bhd.
- iv. October 20th, 2012 - Malaysian police arrested 12 people for the theft of some 1,400 Samsung Galaxy Note 2 devices worth a total 3.23 million ringgit (US\$1.05 million), which took place just a day after the product became available in the country. The smart phones were stolen on Oct. 20, 2012 from the cargo area of Kuala Lumpur International airport where the shipments arrived. The device was launched in Malaysia on Oct. 19, 2012. Syed Ismail Syed Azizan, federal commercial crimes investigation chief, said the 12 people were arrested in raids conducted around the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, most of who were believed to have planned the theft together. About 70 devices had been recovered and police were trying to track down the rest, he added. Among the 12 arrested, three forwarding agents were charged yesterday at the Sessions Court for the crime, and pleaded not guilty.
- v. October 2nd, 2012 - Nine individual plead not guilty at Session Court Butterworth after being charged for stealing 268 cartons computer microprocessor (CPU) worth RM22 million from Moduslinks Sdn Bhd at Perai Industrial Zone. The thieves were armed with samurai swords when they held up a supervisor and six guards going in through a back entrance. They tied up the employees, loaded their getaway truck with three pallets of microchips, and flee the premises. The truck was eventually found by the police. However, they failed to recover the missing products. They since detained seven male suspects connected to the case.
- vi. July 7th, 2012 - A trailer carrying a cargo of soft drinks that was reported stolen in Penang was stopped at Bidor, more than 70km south of here. The Penang police had sent a nationwide alert to keep a lookout for the trailer after it was reported stolen at Taman Limau Manis in Bukit Mertajam at about 1.30am 6th July, 2012. About two hours later, it was spotted at a school located along Jalan Sungkai in Bidor, about 50m from the town's police station. Tapah police chief Supt Somsak Din Keliau said a 32-year-old suspect had been detained in connection with the stolen vehicle and shipment of drinks. "Our men spotted the trailer parked near SMK Syeikh Abdul Ghani and immediately arrested the suspect," he said.

- vii. October 19th, 2011 - Penang police have detained three suspects in connection with the microchip robbery worth hundreds of thousands from a Cargo Terminal at the Bayan Lepas International Airport in Penang. Penang Deputy CID Chief ACP Mohd Nasir Salleh said the three suspects aged between 20 and 23, and employees of a courier company were detained on Monday. The theft was spotted by an employee in the cargo terminal at about 2am on Sunday. The employee found a number of boxes where the microchips were stored, had already been opened. He made a police report and police quickly acted on the report and detained the three suspects," he told Bernama when contacted here today. Mohd Nasir said police were carrying out investigations to identify the mastermind and where the microchips were sold by the suspects. The microchips were meant for export to South Korea.
- viii. September 21st, 2011 - A container loaded with computers worth about RM2mil was hijacked by a group of armed men near the Putra Heights toll plaza. It is learnt the incident happened at about 11am on Monday shortly after the lorry driver left KL International Airport (KLIA) cargo complex and was heading towards the computer manufacturer's warehouse in Subang Jaya. When the driver passed the toll plaza, his vehicle was blocked by another lorry. Several men armed with parang confronted the driver and threatened to harm him if he resisted. They then forced him and the co-driver out before driving off with the lorry containing the computers. The driver lodged a report shortly after. A police patrol car later found the lorry, which had been burnt, near Batu Tiga minus the cargo. Police have recorded statements from the driver and co-driver and believe the hijackers had inside help. Selangor CID chief Senior Asst Comm Mohd Adnan Abdullah confirmed the incident.
- ix. February 11th, 2011 - It was mid-afternoon one day when workers at a factory in the Malaysian state of Perak finished loading more than 700,000 condoms into a shipping container. The container was then driven to Port Klang, the busiest port in the country, and loaded onto a ship bound for Japan. It was a routine procedure for Sagami Rubber Industries, a Japanese company, but by the time the ship docked in the port of Yokohama at the end of January, the condoms had vanished. "The container was empty," said K.K. Leung, the administration manager at Sagami's Malaysian factory, whose Japanese colleagues had alerted him regarding the theft. The case of the missing condoms made headlines in Malaysia, but it was not an isolated case, according to industry groups.
- x. September 29th, 2010 - Police suspected it was an inside job where RM4 million hard disk heist at KLIA cargo terminal in 2010. Many of the employees at cargo complexes are old hands and they work with syndicate members, tipping them of valuable cargo in the

premises," said an official. These thefts are the work of organized crime syndicates which form partnerships with cargo officials. What was shocking was that there were no security guards on duty at the warehouse, enabling the thieves to coolly drive away an eight-tonne lorry packed with 542 boxes containing about 10,800 units of Western Digital hard disks worth an estimated RM4 million. Acting Selangor Criminal Investigation Department chief Assistant Commissioner Omar Mammah confirmed that at the time of the heist, there were no security guards on duty at the warehouse.

Research conducted by Zulaikha, Harlina, Jaafar & Jamaluddin (2013) revealed most cases of the cargo crime committed in Malaysia due to insider job. The cargo crimes are committed at various sites such as seaport, airport warehouses and manufacturer premises. The criminal normally target high value shipments such as electronics, drug and pharmaceutical, cars and latex products.

Cargo theft in Malaysia is now the second highest in Asia-Pacific region by value and expected to increase as more cargo from Singapore (the world's busiest port), is routed overland through Malaysia peninsula, the *New York Times* reported. The US daily, quoting figures compiled by the Transported Asset Protection Association, said more than US\$22.7 million (RM68.9 million) worth of goods was reported stolen from Malaysian ports, airports, warehouses and trucks from 2007 to 2010 (Gooch, 2011). The reluctance of companies in Malaysia to report losses that could impact insurance premiums mean that the total value of goods stolen here is likely much more higher. While transporting goods through Asia-Pacific countries is generally safer than other parts of the world like the Americas, Africa and Europe, there's little question that cargo theft and supply chain risk have increased throughout Asia, the *New York Times* quoted (Gooch, 2011). Malaysia, which lies along a number of important trading routes, is a particular concern. Malaysia is increasingly becoming a key thoroughfare, as more companies ship their goods to and from neighbouring Singapore, which is connected with much of the rest of Southeast Asia by road through Malaysia. This has led companies to take greater security measures like employing armed guards, using electronic seals and installing GPS systems onboard their trucks in Malaysia to prevent them from being hijacked.

Worldwide Cargo Crime Trend

Many times, global economic crisis has increased worldwide demand for black market goods. In the United States, where an estimated \$30 billion in cargo is stolen annually, cargo thieves are sophisticated, organized, and, generally, not home-grown (Palmer, 2010). Palmer (2010) reviewed that the thieves are often recruited from the United States and trained by Cuban crime

syndicates, then sent to Florida to establish their operations. Most of the stolen cargo in the United States is brought to ports and exported in ocean containers to countries such as Paraguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. From there, it is sold through black market distribution network. A range of new cargo theft tactics are being deployed to help thieves take better control and thus mitigate the risks of the crimes they are trying to commit, according to experts with insurance provider Travelers (Kilcarr, 2013). These new tactics fall into three categories: identity theft, fictitious pickups and misdirected loads/fraudulent carriers. They are trying to adjust their methods to develop better ways to get away with cargo. Rather than commit straight theft; where loads are physically stolen from parking lots or terminals and risking getting spotted and/or potentially be involved in a high speed chase; the cargo thieves are trying to be more strategic about thefts so they can better pinpoint and steal specific types of cargo. More of these strategic kinds of thefts due to a combination of factors: more technology being used with greater access to information within the transportation industry and the involvement of more intermediaries throughout the supply chain. This allows cargo thieves to be in better control of the timing and location of a theft is made. In many cases, getting the desired cargoes and handed over to the criminal rather than having to hunt it down and steal them.

Ken Huerta, detective sergeant with the Port of Los Angeles Police, said cargo thieves are using the internet to secure information on shipments (Mongelluzzo, 2010). They get the shipping documentation they require, sometimes from inside sources, in order to secure release of the cargo. These thieves may call a legitimate harbor trucking company whose drivers have Transportation Worker Identification Credentials to pick up the container at the marine terminal and deliver it to a non-descript warehouse location. Huerta said another ploy is for thieves to advertise on-line as a trucking company. Cargo interests or intermediaries whose regular motor carrier is unavailable for a particular job will hire the sham operation. The fly-by-night operator may hold the cargo hostage and demand a large sum of money to release it, or the thief may sell the merchandise (Mongelluzzo, 2010). Cargo theft has been estimated between \$30 and \$50 billion annually and organized retail crime is responsible for nearly half of these losses (Mayhew, 2010). Insurance and law enforcement agencies believe the majority of cargo thefts involve current or former-employees (Russel, 2000). Collusion occurs between current or former employees who are familiar with their company's internal systems and procedures and shipping vendors to commit the cargo crime. Sensitive information such as shipping manifests, schedules, and routes are disclosed to an individual or a criminal syndicate and this information is used to plan and coordinate the theft (Walter, 2009). Research on cargo crime was conducted by Europol in Europe as most of the cargo and/or truck seems to be stolen. The

circumstances of the theft suggested some 'inside information' and the criminal act seems to be organized by a semi-professional entity (Europol, 2009).

In the retail business, booster conspired with current or former store employees. Employee may take goods from storage rooms or receiving areas in stores and provide them directly to booster. They may also help thieves by disabling store alarms, leaving doors unlocked or providing information about computer passwords, alarm codes, keys and security schedules (Finklea, 2012). Industries studies estimated the proportion of inventory loss due to employee theft. For example the 2010 National Retail Security Survey reports that retailers estimated about 45% or retail losses are due to employee theft (Richard & Amanda, 2010). Because trains and trucks of cargo often travel with large quantities of desirable cargoes and this presents a low risk and high reward situation very appealing to criminals. Thieves use a variety method to get the cargo either hijack the trucks to colluding with current or former employees (Finklea, 2012).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As social scientists, criminologists and criminal justice researchers assume that the subject matter they study is probabilistic – that is, they believe that effects will most often occur when certain causes are present, but not in every single case Hagan, 2003). In predicting general patterns, trends and relationships among groups, social scientists do not expect these patterns to hold in each individual case or do not expect absolute determinism (Hagan, 2003). Researchers do attempt to estimate the probability of their predictions being accurate. One method of collecting data is to interview respondents to obtain information on the issues of the research area. Interviews could be unstructured or structured, and conducted either face to face or by telephone or online. Interview is one of the methods used in qualitative research. Structured interviews are those conducted when it is know at the outset what information is needed (Sekaran, 2003). In this research, a list of predetermined questions to be asked of the respondents has being determined and prepared before conducting the interview. The questions are focused on factors that are relevant to the research questions. As the respondents express their views, researcher has noted them down. The same questions have been asked to all the respondents in the same manner. Through this process, new factors have being identified and respondents are able to express their view, resulting in a deeper understanding of the problems. When sufficient number of structured interviews has been conducted and adequate information obtained to understand and describe the important factors operating in the situation, researcher stopped the interviews.

Data collection

In this research convenience sampling methodology has being utilized for the collection of information from members of the security practitioners in Malaysia. Only those who are willing to participate in this research are being considered. Random sampling methodology is not being utilized in this research as the researcher intention is to gather the security practitioners who have the most knowledge in this field are considered. If random sampling method is being used, then the probability of obtaining the most useful information for this research may not be achieved. Structured interview based on consistent set of questions, for comparability from one interview to the next but also flexibility pursued issues as they rose in the discussions as shown in Table 2. Because of limitations of time and resources, these interviews covered only some of the security professionals and warehouse operation and transportation managers in Malaysia. All of them have worked as security professional, logistics or supply chain for many years. All of the interviewees wished to remain anonymous, and to keep the company details confidential whose security they managed unnamed as well. The area discussed based on the respondents' experience toward cargo crime, the type of shipment targeted in cargo crime, and to assess the cargo crime cases they investigated whether any insiders are involved. All the questions were set up before the interview begin and the average duration for each interview is between 1 hour to 2 hours.

Table 2: Structured Interview Questions

1	Foreign joint venture company (); Fully locally managed company ()
2	Could you describe your company and your role within your company?
3	Your company is based in which state in Malaysia?
4	Number of employees in your company?
5	Number of fleet your company is managing?
6	Type of fleet in your company?
7	Type of vehicles used in your company?
8	Main types of cargo / goods transported?
9	Number of theft incident involving your company's truck or cargo in the year?
10	What is the vision and goal of your company from a security viewpoint?
11	Have you ever invested in security for your company?
12	How much yearly budget your company allocated for Security?
13	What have been or would be the main reasons for investing or not investing in security?
14	How do you justify the costs for higher security?
15	Does your company engaged in security Certification / Regulatory requirements includes TAPA FSR (Freight Security Requirements), TAPA TSR (Transport Security Requirements), ISO 28000, ISPS Code (International Ship and Port Security), CTPAT (Custom Trade Partnership against Terrorism), WCO (World Custom Organization) and/or ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). Please specify:

16	Have your company taken sufficient measurement on Security Administrative Control in your premises? Please specify the control measures.
17	Have your company taken sufficient measurement on facility physical security control in your premises? Please specify the control measures.
18	Have your company taken sufficient measurement on trucking security control? Please specify the control measures.
19	What do you think are the main reasons behind the increased insecurity of supply or distribution chains in the transportation sector?
20	How do you cooperate with the law enforcement agencies to prevent cargo crime?
21	Do you think the authority (Police) have taken adequate measure to prevent cargo crime on the road?
22	What do you think about Police effort in combating cargo threats?
23	How fast do the Police respond when there is any case of cargo crime and hijacking reported to them?
24	What are the security control measure taken by highway authority e.g. PLUS to preventing theft and hijacking cases?
25	Is the highway authority taken adequate security control measures in preventing theft and hijacking cases?
26	Is there any dedicated and secured area for truck drivers to rest along the highway and do you think it is sufficient?
27	According to your experience, can you describe how cargo criminals behave?
28	Do you think criminal will move to other location when Police enhance the security in area of crime?
29	Do you think the cargo criminal will stop their activities and why you think so?
30	Do you think the cargo crime was well planned by the culprit or criminal and why did you think so?
31	Do you think most of the cargo crimes are committed due to insider job?
32	Do you think the cargo criminal or hijacker targeted specific cargo they wanted and why do you think so?
33	Why do you think the cargo criminal continues to operate despite continuous effort by Police to combat this crime?
34	Why do you think cargo theft within transportation networks continues to be a significant problem despite the implementation of numerous countermeasures?

Sampling

While there are no closely defined rules for sample size of qualitative research (Baum 2002 & Patton 1990), sampling in qualitative research usually relies on small numbers with the aim of studying in depth and detail (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990). The main target respondents involved in the research are the employees of several transportation companies. The targeted respondents are the Security Manager, Security Executive or even Transport Manager to participate in this survey as they are the most relevant employee in the company who are able to understand the cargo crimes in their company. The respondents are listed in Table 3. Those who are involved in handling cargo crimes were interviewed as they have being involved in investigation of crime cases within their company. This is done to get the feedback

on 'insider job' from them. All of them experienced the cases involved in their company were employees, subcontractors, security guards, warehouses staff and those handling the cargoes tends to be involved. It is also very difficult to charge them in court as there are lack of evidence to proof there is an insider job.

Table 3: List of respondents interviewed related to 'Insider Job'

Respondent No.	Years of experience in transportation or security	Position in company
1	5 years	Security Manager
2	10 years	Regional Security Manager
3	9 years	Transport Manager
4	11 years	Security Manager
5	20 years	Security Manager
6	10 years	Logistics Manager
7	16 years	Transport Manager
8	7 years	Security Manager
9	13 years	Warehouse Manager
10	20 years	Security Manager

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

Respondents were interviewed based on the structured questionnaire as shown in Table 2. Many questions were raised and the questions related to insider's job were the questions No. 30, No. 31 and No. 32. The information collected was tabulated and the data analyzed. This would help the researcher to accomplish the task set out to be done, for example, to describe the phenomena, quantify them, identify the specific problem and evolve a theory of the factors that influence the problem and find answers to the research questions.

Table 4: Respondents answers related to 'Insider Job'

Respondents No.	Years of experience in transportation	Position in company	Responses to questions		
			No. 30	No. 31	No. 32
1	5 years	Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	10 years	Regional Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	9 years	Transport Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	11 years	Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	20 years	Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	10 years	Logistics Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	16 years	Transport Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	7 years	Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	13 years	Warehouse Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes
10	20 years	Security Manager	Yes	Yes	Yes

There are 10 respondents interviewed by researcher. Only 10 respondents were interviewed due to time and resources constraint. Respondents from Police and other agency who conduct investigation on cases related to cargo crime need to be included in this type of research. It was not done in this research as the Police is not willing to participate. It will be better if those perpetrators involved in the cargo crime convicted for cargo crime to be included as respondents so that the research will be more conclusive.

Findings from the interview session conducted revealed that insider job and employee involvement were found in most of the criminal cases investigated by the security manager or the management of the company. All the respondents agreed there are elements of insider job that are related to cargo crime in Malaysia. The respondents concluded that it will be difficult for the crime to be committed without the collaboration from 'inside'. Studies need to be conducted in depth and investigation from the Police will be very useful to confirm that insider job is the culprit to cargo crime in Malaysia. The Police will be able to get more reliable information from the perpetrators who are arrested for such criminal cases.

CONCLUSION

Insider job is one of the main culprits of cargo crime as research evidence revealed that hijacking cases in Malaysia are mostly related to insider job. Hijacking of trucks with cargoes is a cause of great concern as well as a burden to Malaysia economy and the transportation industries. It may also impact the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Malaysia as high cargo crime rate will cause the investors to move away from Malaysia. It is important that the industry players who have interest in cargo crime such as the Malaysia Police Force, ports operators, security professional and transportation industries work together to develop a cooperative approach to the problem faced. Success can only be achieved if all the players combine their effort and cooperate with each others. In order to achieve the cooperative approach; it is the utmost important that criminological analysis of the phenomenon such as crime perpetrator, victims, justice system, the development of prevention and the theories explaining the phenomenon be conducted. Despite the highly scientific relevance, it appears that too little research especially in Malaysia; has been performed to identify factors related to the insider job in Malaysia. There is a need to have a better understanding as to why insider job continues to target cargo crime.

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