

# **FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUNDED PROJECTS IN KENYA: A CASE OF NYANDARUA COUNTY**

**G. Kamau** 

School of Human Resource Development

Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya

kamaugeorgecdf@gmail.com

**M. Muturi**

School of Human Resource Development

Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya

mmuturi2001@yahoo.com

## **Abstract**

*All over the world governments set aside kitties from which they fund essential public projects. In Kenya Constituency Development Fund was launched in year 2003 with the object of enhancing development at the grassroots. However, it has been established that the funds from the CDF kitty do not ensure completion of developmental projects. Many projects derail in completion while others are abandoned altogether. The study sought to assess the factors affecting the successful completion of the CDF funded projects in Kenya. The study was carried out in Nyandarua County, Kenya. Descriptive research design was adopted. The target population constituted 60 members of CDF Committees. A census survey was employed. A structured questionnaire was used to collect primary data. The SPSS software was employed to analyze the collected data. Data was analyzed in form of both descriptive and inferential statistics. The findings indicated that there exists a very strong and positive relationship between funds allocation and successful completion of CDF projects and that there exists a weak and negative relationship between political interest and successful completion of CDF projects. It is recommended that transparency and accountability mechanisms should be put in place and implemented in respect of CDF-funded projects.*

*Keywords: Constituency Development Fund, Fund allocation, Political interest, Projects, Kenya*

## INTRODUCTION

Education is very important to socio-economic prosperity of a country. Institutions of higher Governments globally have ordinarily set aside kitties from which they fund essential public projects. In many countries, there has been unprecedented push for the governments to decentralize many services; social, political and financial amongst others. Indeed, it has been emphasized that there should be devolution of authority to local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local people at the grassroot level (Maina, 2005). According to Burki et al. (1991) and World Bank (2000), countries in the Caribbean, East Asia, and East Europe have embraced decentralization as a crucial component of the development agenda and have fared better than African countries. This was based on the argument that decentralization strengthens local governance, democratization and greater efficiency and equity in the use of public resources and service delivery for development (Rbot, 2002). This is posited to be foundation that decentralization as a development strategy has dominated the discourse on state restructuring in Africa for more than three decades.

Parliamentary involvement in grassroots projects and in community development according to Baskin (2010) has been growing in many countries including Papua New Guinea, Bhutan, Jamaica, Pakistan, India, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. It is further asserted that one of the policy tools for this involvement is Constituency Development Funds (CDF), which commit public finances to benefit specific political sub-divisions through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by their representatives in the National Parliament (Assembly).

Baskin (2010) notes that CDFs are akin to the venerable United States (US) congressional allocations generally referred to as “pork barrel”, “earmarks” or “member items” in national and state-level policy making. Operations of CDFs are said to have sometimes been controversial since they raise fundamental questions about the efficacy of government service delivery, the extent to which such service delivery can be made accountable, the role of legislators in selecting development priorities, and how public participation in policy making can be made more meaningful. Baskin further notes that a better understanding of this evolving policy tool should be developed alongside formulation of guidelines for the transparent and ethical use of such funds in a manner that is free of corruption. It is not clear whether or not the system of earmarks and pork barrel distribution that is practiced in the US national and state government is of a single type with CDFs. The long history of distributive allocations in the US permits a unique opportunity to explore the evolution of systems of politically determined resource allocation for local development. It is further posited that, on the other hand, there may be fundamental difference between US earmarks which are often informal mechanisms that are employed on a case-by-case basis and the institutionalization of distributive mechanisms that

become part of the annual budget process as appears to be the case with CDFs. Zyl (2010) notes that in Philippines Members of Parliament (MPs) are allocated a substantially huge amount of finances (US\$ 4, 270,001) each to cater for the development in their political jurisdiction.

CDFs are viewed by Baskin (2010) as politically-initiated projects. He argues that it appears that they are politically driven development initiatives. He further asserts that the African legislature's project has produced research that demonstrates the rationale of constituency-based politics in Africa in both the supply and demand for constituency service. Constituency-based initiatives are noted that they can protect communities from the impersonal administration of inflexible and centralized state organizations that often overlook individual communities in the name of administrative rationality. In Tanzania, CDF was fully endorsed by President Jakaya Kikwete in year 2008 in his address to Parliament. In Uganda, CDF was borne out of a series of meetings held between the President and members of parliament (MPs) of the 7<sup>th</sup> Parliament in order to relieve MPs of the pressure of their constituents in regard to the promises and other development projects.

According to Zyl (2010), there are open questions as to how large a role CDFs should play in development administration. The claims that CDFs have a negative impact on accountability and service delivery in comparison with other options for strengthening legislatures and improving local projects delivery should be addressed. Zyl further stresses that there are fundamental questions entailing the role CDFs are expected to play in development administration or in how the administration of CDFs affects the balance of power among different branches of Government. Some of these questions include: Will CDFs compete with ministries in service delivery? Will CDFs add to the burdens on ministries through 'fiscal illusions'? or will CDFs ease the administrative burdens on ministries with well-placed implementation of projects that reflect the priorities of local communities? Do CDFs play a fundamental, distributive role that is perceived as more equitable than budgetary disbursements under the control of the executive, or how can a balance be struck between central-administrative and political-local means of identifying and implementing development projects?

In Kenya, the CDF was launched in year 2003 under the CDF Act 2003, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 107 (Act No. 11) with the object of ironing out regional imbalances brought about by patronage politics Nyaguthii and Oyugi, (2013). CDF provides funds to constituencies through the respective members of the National Assembly. Awiti (2008) adds that the aim of the CDF is to combat poverty at the grassroot level through implementing community-based projects and to relieve the members of the National Assembly the burden of fundraising for development projects in their respective constituencies. Gikonyo (2008) observes that

enhanced transparency and oversight through report cards and social audits are increasingly being employed by both the government institutions and by those in the civil society. Enhance transparency appears to require a separation and balance of powers. It is further posited that a CDF that is centrally controlled by the executive and is strictly accountable to the head of state may leave little room for transparency in its operations. Nevertheless, it seems relatively easy to enhance transparency in CDF operations that would lead to more effective accountability of CDFs: either through legislation expanding freedom of information and/or enhancing the transparency and openness of government administration.

The current popularity of CDFs seems to be pegged on the generally held political calculus in which centrally placed politicians bring home development resources to local communities and groups in exchange for political loyalty. It is noted that many Members of the National Assembly opine that CDFs have contributed to a system of political competition whereby political candidates are gauged partly on their effective employment of CDF allocations. Mwangi (2005) posits that a community development project commences with the identification of a need or the realization that there is a need. This is argued by Nyaguthii and Oyugi (2013) to be in tandem with the CDF policy on project identification as it is provided for by the CDF Act 2007's guidelines on project identification. However, as posited by Bagaka (2008), a look at the CDF implementation in the recent past brings to the fore a glaring mismatch between the local nature of capital expenditure decisions and financing for the operations and maintenance of such projects with local benefits. Given the discretionally nature of capital spending and the intrinsic value attached to political symbolism in launching CDF projects, most of the times, new projects are initiated to the detriment of the existing ones which are either left to deteriorate or are insufficiently funded (Nyaguthii & Oyugi, 2013). As such, it is hypothesized that there is a number of challenges that affect the successful completion of CDF in Kenya.

### **Statement of the Problem**

It has been posited that parliamentary involvement in grassroots projects and in community development has been growing in many countries globally, regionally and indeed in Kenya. One of the major involvements of the members of the National Assembly is through the CDF. The object of this fund is to alleviate poverty and also relieve the aforementioned members the burden of development projects in their respective political jurisdiction. However, more often than not, it has been established that the funds from the CDF kitty are not objectively employed for successful completion of developmental projects. Many projects derail in completion while others are abandoned altogether according to National Taxpayers Association (NTA, 2012). The incoming member usually comes up with his or her own development projects especially in

regard to their campaign manifestos. This is to the detriment of the projects initially started by the receding member of the National Assembly. This scenario occasions misdirection of the CDF and also results in many stalled projects. This problem affects the constituents whose member of the National Assembly development policies are not in congruent with those of his or her predecessor. This study sought to unearth the challenges affecting the successful completion of the CDF projects in Kenya with the aim of coming up with feasible recommendations of mitigating the aforementioned challenges.

### **Objectives of the Study**

1. To examine the relationship between funds allocation and successful project completion.
2. To determine the effect of political interests on successful completion of CDF funded project.

### **Research Questions**

1. What is the relationship between funds allocation and successful project completion?
2. How do political interests affect successful completion of CDF funded project?

## **THEORETICAL REVIEW**

### **Theory of Project Implementation**

Nutt (1996) refers to implementation as a series of steps taken by responsible organizational agents to plan change process in order to elicit compliance needed to install changes. Project managers employ project implementation theory to make planned changes in organizations by creating environments in which changes can survive. And be rooted. However, procedural steps in project implementation have been difficult to specify since project implementation is ubiquitous. In line with project implementation theory, Slevin and Pinto (1987) assert that to successfully implement a project is usually difficult and complex. The project manager has to devote more time and energy on human, financial, and technical variables as the key to the realization of project implementation. It is further argued that it is apparent that a number of determinants are capable of affecting project implementation if not handled with care. These include among others: escalation of project cost due to inflation; difficulty in paying contractors due to bureaucracy in Government parastatals; contractors performing below standards and expectations; frequent changes in government; increase in the scope of the project; change in pre-contract consultants such as architects; ineffective project finance arrangement; reorganization of the parastatals; change in the original design; indiscriminate award of

contracts without reference to, for example, the funds available, and location; projects and contracts determined on political considerations; and insufficient working capital.

The project implementation theory emphasizes several critical success factors in project implementation. There should be top management support. Schultz and Slevin (1975) noted that management support for a project or any form of implementation has long been considered of great importance in distinguishing between their ultimate success or failure. Beck (1993) considers project management as not only dependent on top management for authority, direction and support, but ultimately the conduit for implementing top management plans, or goals for the organization. Another critical success factor is the project schedule plan. This refers to the developing of a detailed plan of the required stages of the implementation process. Pinto and Slevin (1989) have drawn parallels between the stages of the implementation process. The need for client consultant has been found to be increasingly important in attempting to successfully implement a project. For instance, Anyanwu (2003) found that the degree, to which clients are personally involved in the implementation process, will cause a great variation in their support for that project. Anyanwu (2003) viewed client consultant as the first stage of a programme to implement change. It is often required throughout the life cycle of the project Schultz, Pinto and Slevin (1987) warns that: it would be dangerous for the project manager to assume that since client consultant was satisfactory at an early stage, this activity could be ignored for the remainder of the project.

Personnel constitute another critical factor. The view is that the most important assets in the building up and efficiency of any organization, be it private or public, depends to a large extent upon how effectively human resources (personnel) are utilized (Nwachukwu, 1988). However, an unfortunate situation could develop, as Pinto and Slevin (1988) observed: in many situations, personnel for the project team are chosen with less-than-full regard for the skills necessary to actively contribute to the success of implementation. It is also emphasized by this theory that monitoring and feedback relative to the project implementation determine the success rate of the project. Communication is further opined by Pinto and Slevin that it is not only essential within the project team itself, but also between the team and the rest of the organization as well as with the client. Troubleshooting is further said to be vital in project implementation. It is argued that regardless of how carefully the project was planned initially, it is impossible to foresee every problem arising from the organizational environment. It is cautioned that each team should obtain technically competent people with the specific assignment to deal with problems when and wherever they arise, and to foresee, and possibly forestall potential trouble areas in the implementation process.

In the light of project implementation theory, it is argued that a number of factors determine the success of the project implementation. These factors are also inherent to CDF-funded projects. For instance, escalation of project costs, bureaucracy that hinders payment of contractors, frequent change in the constituency's leadership of both the legislator and the CDF Committees, amongst others. Akin to the emphasis of project implementation theory, there are a number of critical success factors that should be looked into regarding implementation of CDF-funded projects. The legislator should support the projects; there should be a project schedule plan; the community ought to be consulted and involved in the project implementation since they are the indirect clients of the projects; the CDF-funded project committees should be composed of professional members. These committees should have the capacity in terms of skills and resources for troubleshooting during project implementation.

## **EMPIRICAL REVIEW**

Here, empirical studies on amount of funds allocated and political interest in the light of successful completion of CDF funded projects are reviewed. The review starts with global perspective followed by regional perspective and then narrows down to the local perspective.

### **Funds Allocation versus Successful Project Completion**

CDF programs are said to allow for policy decisions to be made by individual legislators. The legislature approves the overall CDF budget and may set parameters for its expenditure, yet, within these broad constraints it is alleged that individual legislators or their committees have a free hand from a constitutional perspective, it is asserted that CDFs are the wrong answer to the very real problems of underfunding in areas that are in need of development, the national government's failure to address the needs on the ground, and the practice of withholding funds from areas controlled by opposition parties. The solution to this problem is not to give individual MPs money to spend in guise of CDFs; rather, it is to devise more effective ways of devolving resources to local areas and involving communities directly in decisions about how to spend these resources (Murray, 2011).

The amount allocated to the CDF projects was found to be insufficient according to the UDN study. In Kenya, the current allocation of CDF is 2.5% of the national budget which is felt by many people to be rather small and may need to be enhanced to at least 5%. In a survey by Ochanda (2010) it was noted that it is still clear that the cumulated amount of funds that go through the district treasuries are much higher than the overall CDF allocation. At the constituency level, the entire amount allocated to each constituency is to be spent based on functional criteria set in the law. One criterion emphasizes that not less than 73% of the CDF

allocation should be spent on development projects. According to the statutes, for projects to qualify for CDF funding, they must satisfy three major criteria. First, they must be development-oriented and not recurrent; for instance, funds may be disbursed to build school classrooms but not payment of teachers. Second, projects must be community-based so as to spread the benefits to many constituents. Lastly, the funds can only be disbursed to a defined, auditable phase, unit or element of a given project. It is further noted that once funds are allocated to a given project, they cannot be reallocated or diverted to another project in the same year.

According to a report by NACCSC (2008), the CDF Act (2003) allocates some money for emergencies without specifying what constitutes an emergency. Furthermore, by setting aside money as CDF office running costs, the Act not only allows for taking away the needed development funds for higher priority projects but also makes the CDF office to be treated as development project itself. This reduces the amount of funds needed to be allocated to more deserving developmental projects. The report recommends that the current CDF kitty be doubled. In the light of some constituencies having more development needs than others and given that CDF allocations are almost equal in all constituencies, more funds are required to go into the CDF kitty. This is observed to not only avail more resources for local level development but also increase equity and/or inclusivity.

It is noted that the community is minimally involved in the allocation of CDF to selected projects; and that CDF structural weaknesses could possibly help to explain the existence or otherwise of transparency in allocation and utilization of CDF as well as accountability of committee members. Several weaknesses of the CDF as currently constituted were identified. The weaknesses appear to revolve around issues of CDF allocation, project identification, distribution, management, community participation in project design, prioritization, and monitoring and evaluation. A study by the NTA (2012) on 'Citizen's CDF report card for Kibwezi constituency, Kenya' established that Kshs 19.7 million of taxpayers' money has been wasted on badly implemented projects. That is, 31% of the total CDF funds allocated to the monitored projects in the financial year 2009/10 were alleged to be on badly implemented projects. Moreover, Kshs 2.4 million of taxpayers' money which is equivalent to 4% of the total CDF funds allocated to the monitored projects in the same financial year were on abandoned projects. On the other hand, 8% (Kshs 5.15 million) of the allocated funds in the same year was unaccounted for.

### **Political Interest and Successful Project Completion**

It is posited by Murray (2011) that legislators have a personal interest in the way the CDF money is spent in their respective constituencies. The rationale is to support their reelection

prospects. He argues that this not an illegitimate interest given that the legislators' job of representation is to make decisions that serve the interests of their constituents and, therefore, win approval from likely supporters in order to help secure their reelection. However, when the legislators make decisions on their own on how about how and where to spend public money in their constituencies, there is a conflict of interest.

Usually the immediate personal interests of individual legislators in providing benefits to their constituents are mediated by normal legislative process, in which the particular interests of each legislator compete with those of others. In the case of CDFs, by removing the mediating, collective approval process, an important restraint on legislators who would use public resources to serve their personal political interests is lost. Legislators are often free to use CDF funds to woo their most likely supporters and ignore those who will not make a difference. In their study, Keefer and Khemani (2009) conclude that in India, MPs put considerably less effort into disbursing CDF to their party strongholds than in less secure seats.


MPs were found by the UDN study to have a tendency of failing to follow the guidelines for disbursing the CDF monies. It is indicated that Tanzanians are advised that Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) projects are gifts from the Government and are not supported by loans obtained from the World Bank. This is contrary to the fact that TASAF is one of the largest social funds designed and funded by the World Bank in sub-Saharan Africa. The political intervention is brought to the fore by the observation that due to parliamentary pressure, the social fund was expanded to all Tanzania's districts. The performance of the TASAF projects has, however, been critical. It is alleged that there has been scope for the local leadership to influence the selection and allocation of TASAF projects. It is exemplified that despite the fact that in one district only one project was operating per Ward and that the only village to have two projects was the council chairperson's village. The council chairperson it was established is one of a number of councilors who is part of the District Steering Committee of the TASAF projects.

With increased awareness and interest amongst the public, the CDF is argued to have occasioned a lot of benefits and indeed met the development needs of the constituents. However, it is noted that CDF has only been successful in constituencies where the MP does not interfere with the CDF Committee decisions and activities. It is indicated that MPS are accorded too many powers in the CDF governance structure. They enact CDF legislation. The parliamentary committee in charge of finance is known to oversee implementation of the CDF and also enjoys powers to determine the allocated amounts, develop policy, and indeed has the final say on issues of CDF implementation. According to the same study, MPs appoint the CDF Committee members who manage the CDF in the constituencies, and act as their chairpersons.

In certain instances, an MP may unduly influence their ‘allies’ and political ‘cronies or sycophants’ on the CDF Committee and make all critical decisions akin to a ‘kitchen cabinet’ to be rubberstamped by the other CDF Committee members. This duplicity of roles makes CDF a de facto ‘MP’s kitty’ without regard to MP’s competence in development planning and implementation, and also fails to provide sufficient checks to prevent abuse. Further, there are insufficient checks and balances in the governing structure. The CDF Board is reluctant to hold errant MPs to account. It is opined that the best solution to CDF’s problem of accountability and conflicts of interest is to remove MPs entirely from the administration of these programs including the choice of projects (Murray, 2011). He adds that CDFs would then be funds that are sent in constituencies on projects identified by members of the constituency through established structures.

### Conceptual Framework

Conceptual framework illustrates the interaction of study variables; mainly the independent and dependent variables. The two sets of variables are in tandem with the study objectives. Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework. As illustrated, funds misappropriation, project committee composition, funds allocation, and political interests affect the successful completion of CDF-funded projects.



## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### Research Design

The study employs descriptive research design. This is founded on the assertion that descriptive research design attempts to find solutions to “what was” and “what is” questions. In the context of the proposed study, the major question is: what are the challenges affecting the

successful implementation of Constituency Development Fund projects in Kenya. This kind of research design describes the situation as it were and enables the researcher to draw pertinent inferences. Research methods are a constituent of research methodology and enable a researcher to get a solution to a problem according to Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi (2006). The researcher adopted quantitative research method and in particular survey research method. A survey of CDF Committee members was conducted across the five Constituencies of Nyandarua County. Survey method was preferred since it is argued to be the most suitable for a study that is taking at a specific point in time.

### **Target Population**

The target population constituted all the 60 members of CDF Committees in Nyandarua County. The CDF Committee members were targeted due to the fact that they were likely to be the most privy with their CDF projects

### **Census**

The study adopted a census study. In this case all members of the target population participated in the study. The census method enhances the accuracy of the research findings due to the fact that it eliminates the sampling bias and sampling error. Given that the sampling error was eliminated, the findings were highly generalizable to the population of the study. This means the findings of the study in Nyandarua County were a replica of the situation in all other Counties in Kenya regarding the CDF-funded projects.

### **Research Instrument**

The researcher employed structured questionnaires to collect primary data. The questionnaires were structured in such a way that they captured brief demographic information of the respondents and more importantly all the study variables (funds misappropriation, composition of project committees, funds allocation, political interest, and successful completion of CDF projects).

### **Pilot Study**

Prior to the main study a pilot study constituting 10% of the targeted respondents was carried out. As such, therefore, 7 respondents took part in the pilot study. The respondents participating in this study were excluded from the main study. The aim of undertaking a pilot test was to establish any potential weaknesses of the research instrument by testing both the reliability and validity of the instrument.

## Reliability and Validity of Research Instrument

Reliability is argued to be one of the most important elements of test quality. It looks into the consistency, or reproducibility, or an examinee's performance on the test. In this study, internal consistency reliability test was used. Kimberlin and Winterstein (2008) observed that internal consistency gives an estimate of the equivalence of sets of items from the same test. The coefficient of internal consistency, they argued, provides an estimate of the reliability of measurement and is based on the assumption that items measuring the same construct should correlate. The most widely used method for estimating the internal consistency reliability is the Cronbach's alpha (Crocker & Algina, 1986). Cronbach's alpha is a function of the average inter-correlations of items and the number of items in the scale. It is usually used for summated scales. All things being equal, the greater the number of items in a summated scale, the higher the Cronbach's alpha tends to be. Having multiple items to measure a construct is argued to aid in the determination of the reliability of measurement and, in general, improves the reliability or precision of the measurement (DeVellis, 2006). The three constructs under study (funds allocation, political interest, and successful completion of CDF projects) returned alpha values greater than 0.7. Precisely, they returned  $\alpha = 0.73$ ,  $\alpha = 0.77$ , and  $\alpha = 0.71$  respectively. As such, the instrument was deemed reliable for use in data collection in the main study.

Validity is arguably the most important criteria for the quality of a test. Validity is said to refer to whether or not the test measures what it claims to measure. In a test with high validity the items will be closely linked to the test's intended focus. There are several ways to estimate the validity of a test, but in the context of the proposed study, the researcher intends to use content validity test. Validity requires that an instrument is reliable but an instrument can be reliable without being valid (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008). This study employed content validity testing. This type of validity addresses how well the items developed to operationalize a construct provide an adequate and representative sample of all the items that might measure the construct of interest. Kimberlin and Winstein argue that since there is no statistical test to determine whether a measure adequately covers a content area or adequately represents a construct, content validity usually depends on the judgment of experts in the relevant field. As such, the researcher sought expert opinions from his University supervisor in order to determine the content validity of the research instruments.

## Data Processing and Analysis

The data collected was first grouped and then edited before being coded using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS Version 21.0). The data was, therefore, processed and analyzed using the SPSS. Data was analyzed by use of both descriptive and inferential

statistics. Descriptive analysis comprised of measures of distribution (frequencies and percentages), measures of central tendencies (mean) and measures of variability (standard deviation,). On the other hand the Pearson's correlation analysis was employed to facilitate drawing of conclusions pertinent to the study objectives. The analyzed data was presented in form of tables that reflected both the descriptive and inferential statistics.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

### Funds Allocation

The third objective touched on funds allocation. Against this backdrop, the study assessed the views of the CDF Committee members on allocation of funds to various CDF projects (Table 1).

Table 1: Funds Allocation

	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
The legislature approves the overall CDF budget and may set parameters for its expenditure.	57	2	5	4.13	.661
Individual legislators or their committees have a free hand from a constitutional perspective, to allocate CDF funds to projects.	57	3	5	4.55	.363
There is a practice of withholding funds from areas controlled by opposition parties	57	2	4	3.22	.461
Funds are allocated to requisite projects at specific times in a financial year	57	4	4	4.00	.000
The amount allocated to the CDF projects is insufficient	57	3	5	4.61	.425
The CDF funds can only be allocated to a defined, auditable phase, unit or element of a given project.	57	3	5	4.86	.444
Once funds are allocated to a given project, they cannot be reallocated or diverted to another project in the same financial year.	57	2	5	4.61	.553
The greatest proportion of the CDF allocation should be spent on development projects	57	5	5	5.00	.000

Respondents were in absolute agreement (mean = 5.00; SD = 0.000) that the greatest proportion of the CDF allocation should be spent on development projects. They also uniformly agreed (mean = 4.00; SD = 0.000) that funds are allocated to requisite projects at specific times in a financial year. It was strongly agreed (mean  $\approx$  5.00) that individual legislators or their committees have a free hand from a constitutional perspective, to allocate CDF funds to projects; the amount allocated to the CDF projects is insufficient; the CDF funds can only be allocated to a defined, auditable phase, unit or element of a given project; and also that once funds are allocated to a given project, they cannot be reallocated or diverted to another project in the same financial year. The CDF Committee members agreed (mean  $\approx$  4.00) that the

legislature approves the overall CDF budget and may set parameters for its expenditure. On average they were, nevertheless, unsure (mean = 3.22) if there is a practice of withholding funds from areas controlled by opposition parties.

### Political Interest

Moreover, the opinions of the CDF Committee members were sought in line with political interest and CDF projects. Table 2 illustrates the respondents' opinions regarding this issue.

Table 2: Political Interest

	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Legislators have a personal interest in the way the CDF money is spent in their respective constituencies.	57	1	5	4.21	.790
MPS are accorded too many powers in the CDF governance structure.	57	1	2	1.62	.084
When legislators make decisions on their own on how and where to spend CDF funds in their constituencies, there is a conflict of interest.	57	1	4	3.79	.461
Legislators are often free to use CDF funds to woo their most likely supporters and ignore those who will not make a difference.	57	1	1	1.00	.000
CDF has only been successful in constituencies where the MP does not interfere with the CDF Project Committee decisions and activities.	57	2	5	4.33	.771
The best solution to CDF's problem of accountability and conflicts of interest is to remove members of the National Assembly entirely from the administration of the CDF projects	57	1	5	4.22	.810

All the respondents strongly disagreed (mean = 1.00; SD = 0.000) that legislators are often free to use CDF funds to woo their most likely supporters and ignore those who will not make any difference. It was also disagreed (mean = 1.62) that members of the National Assembly are accorded too many powers in the CDF governance structure. CDF Committee members agreed (mean  $\approx$  4.00) that when legislators make decisions on their own on how and where to spend CDF funds in their constituencies, there is conflict of interest; CDF has only been successful in constituencies where the MP does not interfere with the CDF Project Committee decisions and activities; and that the best solution to CDF's problem of accountability and conflicts of interest is to remove members of the National Assembly entirely from the administration of the CDF projects.

### Effect of Funds Allocation on Successful Completion of CDF Projects

Furthermore, the study investigated the implication of funds allocation to various CDF projects on the success completion of those projects. Table 3 outlines the pertinent correlation analysis results.

Table 3: Correlation between Funds Allocation and Successful Completion of CDF Projects

		Successful Completion of CDF Projects
<b>Funds Allocation</b>	Pearson Correlation	.947**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	57

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The results of the correlation analysis indicated that there exists a very strong and positive relationship between funds allocation and successful completion of CDF projects ( $r = 0.947$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). As already indicated the relationship between the two variables is statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance. Interpretatively, how funds are allocated to the CDF projects is very consequential on the projects' successful completion. Any interference with the funds allocation will affect the projects' completion.

#### Effect of Political Interest on Successful Completion of CDF Projects

In tandem with the fourth objective the study sought to find out how political interests affect successful completion of CDF projects. Table 4 illustrates the results of the correlation analysis between Political Interest and Successful Completion of CDF Projects.

Table 4: Correlation between Political Interest and Successful Completion of CDF Projects

		Successful Completion of CDF Projects
<b>Political Interest</b>	Pearson Correlation	-.341*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.023
	N	57

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The findings indicate that there exists a weak and negative relationship between political interest and successful completion of CDF projects ( $r = 0.341$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). The relationship was, however, significant at 0.05 significance level. The findings implied that the more political interest play a part in CDF projects, the less the probability of the successful completion of the aforesaid projects. Though the implication of political interest on successful completion of CDF projects is relatively low, it is significant in that it cannot be wished away. The findings bring to the fore the shortcomings of involving politics in CDF projects.

## SUMMARY

CDF Committee members drawn from all the five Constituencies of Nyandarua County were unanimous (mean = 5.00; SD = 0.000) in their opinions that the greatest proportion of the CDF allocation should be spent on development projects. It was established that, funds are allocated to requisite projects at specific times in a financial year; individual legislators or their committees have a free hand from a constitutional perspective, to allocate CDF funds to projects; the amount allocated to the CDF projects is insufficient, which agreed with Ochanda's (2010) observation that amount of funds that go through the district treasuries are much higher than the overall CDF allocation; the CDF funds can only be allocated to a defined, auditable phase, unit or element of a given project; once funds are allocated to a given project, they cannot be reallocated or diverted to another project in the same financial year; and also that the legislature approves the overall CDF budget and may set parameters for its expenditure. The results of the correlation analysis indicated that there exists a very strong and positive relationship between funds allocation and employee performance ( $r = 0.947$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ).

It was found that all respondents strongly disagreed (mean = 1.00; SD = 0.000) that legislators are often free to use CDF funds to woo their most likely supporters and ignore those who will not make any difference. On average, was also disputed (mean = 1.62) that members of the National Assembly are accorded too many powers in the CDF governance structure. CDF Committee members agreed (mean  $\approx 4.00$ ) that when legislators make decisions on their own on how and where to spend CDF funds in their constituencies, there is conflict of interest which concurred with Keefer and Khemani (2009) earlier findings. It was also found that CDF has only been successful in constituencies where the MP does not interfere with the CDF Project Committee decisions and activities; and that the best solution to CDF's problem of accountability and conflicts of interest is to remove members of the National Assembly entirely from the administration of the CDF projects. The findings indicate that there exists a weak and negative relationship between political interest and successful completion of CDF projects ( $r = 0.341$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ).

## CONCLUSIONS

The study inferred that the greatest proportion of the CDF allocation should be spent on development projects. It was further concluded that the allocation of CDF funds to Constituency's projects is within the discretion of CDF Committees and the sitting legislators. Once, the funds have been allocated to a given project the allocated funds cannot be rechanneled to other projects during the same financial year. It was, moreover, concluded that

how funds are allocated impacts very significantly on successful completion of CDF projects in Nyandarua County.

It was concluded that legislators are not free to employ CDF funds to woo their political cronies. Members of the National Assembly are not accorded too many powers in the CDF governance structure. In addition, the study concluded that, interference of CDF projects by the members of the National Assembly is likely to negate the intended benefits of these projects. It was deduced that though political interest are significant in CDF projects, their impact on successful completion of those projects is quite marginal.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It ought to be ensured that the largest proportion of the CDF funds are allocated to development projects such as schools, roads and health facilities. The members of the public should be involved in identifying development projects that ought to be funded using the CDF kitty. It is recommended that the members of the National Assembly should only play an oversight role in CDF projects. Projects and politics should never be mixed for the sake of successful completion of CDF projects. Political cronies should never be part of CDF Committees in order to eliminate any vested political interests in CDF projects.

## REFERENCES

- Anyanwu, L. U. (2003). *Project Management in a Developing Nation*. Onitsha: Africana-Feb Publishers.
- Awiti, V.P. (2008). An assessment of the use and management of development funds: The case of Constituencies Development Fund in Kenya
- Bagaka, O. (2008). Fiscal decentralization in Kenya and the growth of government: The Constituency Development Fund. Illinois: Northern Illinois University.
- Baskin, M. (2010). Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) as a tool for decentralized development. *Centre for International Development*.
- Crocker, J., & Algina, J. (1986). *Introduction to Classical and Modern Day Theory*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Gikonyo, W. (2008). *The CDF Social Audit Guide: A Handbook for Communities*. Nairobi: Open Society Initiative for East Africa.
- Keefer, P. & Khemani, S. (2009). When do legislators pass on 'pork'? The role of political parties in determining legislator effort. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4929*.
- Kimberlin, C.L., & Winterstein, A.G. (2008). Research fundamentals. *Am J Health-Syst Pharm, 65*.
- Maina, B. (2005). Monitoring and evaluation of support to decentralization and local governance: Kenya case study. *Working Paper No. 61: European Centre for Development Policy Management*.
- Murray, C. (2011). Constituency development funds: Are they constitutional? *International Budget Partnership, 4(12)*.
- National Taxpayers Association. (2012). *Citizen's Constituency Development Fund Report Card for Kibwezi Constituency, Makeni County*. Nairobi: NTA.

- Nutt, P. C. (1996). Tactics of implementation approaches for planning. *Academy of Management Journal*, 8.
- Nyaguthii, E. & Oyugi, L.A. (2013). Influence of community participation on successful implementation of Constituency Development Fund projects in Kenya: A case of Mwea Constituency. *International Journal of Education and Research*, 1(8), 1 – 16.
- Ochanda, G. (2010). *Survey findings on poverty reduction through improved governance on Constituency Development Fund (CDF)*. Nairobi: Kenya Episcopal Conference.
- Rajasekar, S., Philominathan, P., & Chinnathambi, V. (2006). *Research Methodology*. Taminada.
- Schultz, R. L., Slevin, D., & Pinto, S. K. (1987). Strategy and tactics in a process model of project management interfaces. *Management Journal*, 17(3), 34-46.
- Slevin D. P. & Pinto, J. K. (1989). Critical factors in project implementation. *Transaction of Engineering Management*, 34(1), 22-27.
- Slevin D. P., & Pinto, J. K. (1987). balancing strategy and tactics in project implementation. *Sloan Management Review*, 29(6), 33-41.
- World Bank. (2000). *Entering the Twenty First Century: The changing landscape*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.